Foreword

An absolute necessity to any research of World War II are the official reports generated at Army, Corps, Division, Regiment and Battalion levels of command. Known as "After Action Reports", these monthly records, when coupled with daily unit journals and where filed, recommendations for unit citations, provide a broad range of data that is essential to an understanding of operations and combat relative to the American armies.

An additional primary source material available to the historian is the Combat Interview. Basically, this document deals with the audition of individual combatants of varied entities down to the company and platoon level. For the most part, they are roughly composed, frequently lacking correction of spelling, grammar and typographic errors. That said, these informal interviews, conducted shortly after an engagement, are of inestimable value to the historian. More often than not they project a personal view of the battle, at the sharp end of the struggle, that includes all the stress and terror of combat, as well as its tragedy and heroics, which the formal, higher level reports omit.

It is good fortune when an account of battle can combine the content of one such Combat Interview with the personal recollections of some of those involved in that specific action. Hopefully, what is recorded here does justice to three combat soldiers and their small part in a long forgotten engagement of a very large battle.

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By the early hours of December 18, 1944, the German advance in the Ardennes was approaching full tide and as part of this trust the outline of the american defensive position covering St Vith was taking shape. Central to its formation was the arrival of 7th Armored Division, which was being fed into the general area as it arrived.

7th Armored, commended by Brigadier General Robert W. Hasbrouck, was just prior to the beginning of the Ardennes Offensive, positioned "in an area astride the Dutch-German border in the vicinity of Heerlen, Holland and Ubach, Germany. (Distinguished Unit Citation Recommendation, 7th Armored Division, June 27, 1947) Some 113 km from its eventual destination the Division was alerted, via telephone, at 1730 on December 16, to prepare a movement to Monarch, (the code name for VIII Corps) Ninth Army followed this with designated route and assembly area destinations of St-Vith, Recht, Vielsalm, Beho.

Proceeding in two columns, the 7th Armored Division moved out with its Combat Command R, Comanded by (temporary) Lieutenant Colonel Fred M. Warren following the "east route" while CCB, under Brigadier General Bruce C. Clark and CCA, commanded by Colonel Dwight A. Rosebaum, moved via Verviers, Trois-Ponts, Vielsalm. Plagued by congested roads filled with vehicles headed west to escape the advancing Germans, it was not until midnight of December 17, that CCB had reached Saint-Vith and completed its defenses east of the town. By early evening of the 17th, Rosebaum's CCA had reached its assembly area at Beho, some 19 km from Saint-Vith. Northwest of CCB, Warren's Combat Command R had arrived at Recht, providing protection for the left flank of Clark's CCB at Saint-Vith.

The Germans had already taken Winterspelt, Steinbruch, Schonberg and Wallerode in their drive. They were in the process of isolating and defeating the 106th Infantry Division of Major General Allen W. Jones and leaving only his 424th Infantry Regiment and the attached CCB of the 9th Armored Division to hold the defensive perimeter running south of Saint-Vith and facing the Our River. Although a line running generally southeast from Recht to Saint-vith and south from this crossroad had thus been established, Warren's northern terminal was short-lived.

 Hardly had CCR "closed into its assembly area at Recht when a report arrived that the Germans had occupied Ligneuville some 8 km to the north. (Unit Citation, 7th Armored Division). The Germans were, in fact, a portion of SS-Standartenfuhrer Max Hansen's Kampfgruppe of 1st SS Panzer Division. Prudently, Lieutenant Colonel Warren directed that a reconnaissance confirm the report. He then made the decision to hold Recht with what he had available. What he had was the 17th Tank Battalion - without infantry support!

Establishing roadblocks around Recht with two companies of medium tanks and a platoon of Stuarts, Warren gambled that he could hold Recht until the morning of December 18. Moving with dispatch, as they invariably did, the Germans of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, supported by assault guns of 1st SS Panzerjager Abteilung hit the town from the north and northeast at 0200. The assault was so determined that Warren, fearing a heavy loss of tanks, since they lacked infantry support, ordered a withdrawal at 0245. He directed that 17th Tank Battalion move south of Recht and CCR Headquarters retire to the village of Poteau, some 5 km to the southwest. Here, CCR tarried long enough to clear the vehicular traffic jam that had developed beyond Poteau resulting from other units fleeing the approaching Germans. As CCR Headquarters pulled out of the village at 0720 and headed southwest toward Vielsalm, German fire fell on Poteau.

The movement of CCA from Scherpenseel, Germany had commenced at 0700 the morning of December 17th. The day was overcast, the ground soft, the roads muddy and slick. In 2nd Platoon, C Company - 40th Tank Battalion, sergeant Donald Hondorp, a 22 year old former welder from Grand Rapids, Michigan remembered it as "a long, cold and miserable day" and "the necessary air intake through the open hatches" as bitter. (Letter to the author from Donald Hondorp, December 20, 1996). After the "Battalion closed into a muddy field (A.A.Report - 40th Tank Battalion, December 44) west of Beho, Hondorp was fortunate enough to find shelter in a farm house with each tank crew requisitioning "every second house". (Letter to the author from Donald Hondorp, January 25, 1997).

40th Tank Battalion was a formidable armored unit. Its four companies had an effective strengh of 58 tanks. Headquarters mustered an additional 2 tanks and the strength of the Assault Gun Platoon stood at 5 - 105's. Of the 41 medium tanks, C Company claimed the largest number of Shermans - 15.

C Company's commander, Captain Roy "Big Moose" Nelson was held in high esteem. One member of his unit recalled,"He stood his place in line when A Rations in the field were apparent, with mess kit in hand and captain's bars barely visible on his collar. The same rain that fell on us fell also on him". Subordinate to Nelson were his three platoon leaders, Lieutenant Gerald E. Reeves - 1st Platoon, Lieutenant James L. Sparing - 2nd Platoon and Lieutenant Gline commanding 3rd Platoon.

Commanding 40th Tank Battalion, John Brown was a Georgian who had been the unit's Executive Officer until he replaced Colonel Edaward T. McConnell, evacuated after being wounded by shrapnel at Metz. Brown was remembered by his S-2, Captain William Power, as being "six feet four inches with the widest shoulders I have ever seen". Brown's Operations Officer was Major Carl M. Corbin, a former reporter for The Times-Picayune. Corbin had volunteered in May 1941 in expectation of a "completion of my peace time service of one year at Camp Shelby. (A WWII Memoir - Carl Corbin, Baton Rouge, 1996).

Having settled into his quarters in Beho, Rosebaum was instructed by 7th Armored Division Headquarters, around midnight, to alert his command for movement on 30 minutes notice. Although Recht had not yet been attacked by the Germans, the timing of the alert underscores the general unease that prevailed at 7th Armored Headquarters in Saint-Vith, concerning the northern flank.

December 18th dawned as bitterly cold as the previous day, with an accompanying overcast. By 0800 the Germans struck at Hunningen in the sector of CCB, 7th Armored Division, just to the north of Saint-Vith. Shortly therafter, Hasbrouck's headquarters received news of the fall of Poteau and reacted accordingly. Since the village sat astride the Saint-Vith - Vielsalm road its loss cut a main artery between two segments of the 7th Armored and placed the enemy in position to seriously threaten the flank and rear of the American force to the south. In fact, if the Germans continued to push hard, the entire salient might have to be abandoned.

 By 1015 a liaison officer brought instructions from Lieutenant Colonel Brown at CCA Headquarters "for Company C to move to the Beho crosroads to receive further instructions".(After Action Report, 40th Tank Battalion) B Company, Captain Emerson wolfe commanding, the Assault Gun Platoon, and A Company under the command of Captain Malcolm Allen, followed while the light tanks of Captain Walter Hughes remained in bivouac. At Beho, an advance guard (Two reports describe this group differently. One to it as an advance party, another as a task force) was formed consisting of C Company, 40th Tank Battalion and C Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion, both under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Brown. The remainder of 48th Armored Infantry Battalion and 40th Tank Battalion (-D Company) followed as Combat Command A left Beho, its mission to retake Poteau.

Moving along the road from Beho to Saint-Vith, Rosebaum's command first passed through the village of Crombach, Braunlauf and Neudorf. The road was becoming increasingly difficult for the passage of heavy vehicles, as Lieutenant Reeves's 1st Platoon was first in line. The lead tank was that of Sergeant Truman Luther Van Tine. Included in Van Tine's Sherman were gunner - Gerald Nelson, driver - Michael Tabatcher and loader, Thomas Clapper. Of the group Corporal Nelson was the youngest. He had turned 20 years old the previous September, the same month he joined the 7th Armored Division. The red-headed Nelson, from Two Rivers, Wisconsin, was a sensitive, caring individual. Taken under Van Tine's wing, he can still recall that at the end of a hectic day the Sergeant would say,"See, we made it through another one. It wasn't that bad, was it? We're one day closer to the end." (Letter to the author from Gerald Nelson, May 2, 1988) As Nelson reached Saint-Vith and turned northwest toward Poteau, he was within three hours of the most tragic and heroic event of his life.

Doggedly moving through Saint-Vith, CCA was subjected to enemy mortar fire being placed on all roads entering or leaving the town. Beyond, the road to Poteau, which measured some 19 km, was snow covered on each side and heavily timbered. This screening offered some protection but also limited maneuverability.

Near the head of the column, as it threaded its way forward, was the command half-track of Colonel Rosebaum. A graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the CCA Commander, a native of Missouri, was an aggresive leader. His direction of CCA since the previous August gave him longevity among all those who had served as a Combat Commander in 7th Armored Division. The record of CCA was a reflection of his leadership. He was a good soldier.

Apprehension, although not mentioned in a 40th Tank Battalion report, was manifest. "Information of friendly and enemy troops, because of the confusion caused by the breakthrough and the suddenness of our move to the new area, was extremely vague", bordered on the admission. As for Major Corbin, part of 40th Tank Battalion's Headquarters' personnel, it was freely expressed. He was "……scared. You didn't know when the crisis that was out there all around three sides of the area that 7th Armored was clinging to would come home to you as an individual." (Corbin Memoir)

A railroad cut and tracks leading from Vielsalm passed the outskirts of the village and continued in a northeasterly direction to Born. The vital juncture that made Poteau so important was formed by the road that linked Vielsalm and Recht, which passed through the village and as it did so was joined by the road from Saint-Vith that entered Poteau from the south.

Although the last 5.5 km approach of the road from Saint-Vith was in a northwesterly direction, just before it reached Poteau, it turned almost due west and then abruptly swung north, coming into the village from its lower end. Unlike the tree cover that existed on both sides of this road outside Poteau, there was a clearing on the right for approximately 300 yards just before it entered the village. Any movement could be observed from across the railroad cut and the high ground beyond. In addition, there was another gap in the protective tree line approximately 700 yards farther back on the right hand side of the road. This spacing also provided a clear view of anything or anyone approaching the vital juncture in the village.

The Germans had occupied Poteau during the morning of the 18th and had fortified the buildings with snipers and set up machine gun positions to cover the approaches to the village by any enemy force. Further, grenadiers armed with panzerfausts were prepared to resist the intrusion of armored vehicles. Across the railroad cut and the ground rising beyond it assault guns had been positioned and sighted-in on the two clearings of the road to their front.

After Saint-Vith, CCA had passed through the village of Rodt and continued on to Poteau. The lead element of Captain Roy Nelson's Company C was still 1st Platoon which consisted of the tank of Sergeant Van Tine followed by tose of Sergeant Milan K. Alpeter, Lieutenant Reeves and Lieutenant Gayle H. Spencer. Trailing Reeves'command was a platoon of C Company - 48th Armored Infantry Battalion, "then by the other two platoons of C Company 40th TB. and brought up by the remainder of C Company, 48AIB, A Company, 48 AIB and BCompany 48 AIB." (Combat Interview of Lt. Gerald E. Reeves, 1st Platoon, C Company, 40th Tank Battalion, 3 January 1945.)

First contact with enemy according to Lieutenant Reeves occured "when the leading tanks reached the clearing in the woods about 1000 yards east of Poteau. Here the Shermans of Sergeant Van Tine and Alpeter were fired upon by enemy self-propelled weapons across the railroad cut", (Reeves, Combat interview) as they dashed into the gap. Although the tanks of Lieutenants Reeves and Spencer followed safely, the forward movement of the entire column was stopped.

Making his way across the clearing, Lieutenant Colonel John Brown ordered fire to be directed against the Germans in order to silence the continued shelling of his command. As part of this suppressive fire one Sherman moved off the road and into the woods. Traversing its 75mm 180 degrees, the tank backed out of the woods, turned the gun toward the cut and fired. It quickly moved back into cover.

 Brown's other worry was a possible threat to his Shermans from any German panzergrenadiers advancing through the woods agains the right flank of 1st Platoon as it stood on the road. Lacking infantry support at this point, Brown out posted his right with members of the tank crews until the lead platoon of C Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion reached the standing tanks. (Since there is evidence that none of the Armored Infantry of C/48 off-loaded from their vehicles until they reached a point on the road some 400 yards from Poteau, these troops undoubtedly raced across the clearing to reach 1st Platoon.)

The Shermans of Van Tine and Alpeter now continued to move forward on the road until they reached the last open ground that separated them from the village of Poteau. Gunning their motors the drivers of both Shermans emerged into the clearing and advanced, receiving small arms fire from house at the southern edge of the village. Having reconnoitered the entrance to Poteau and established the presence of the enemy, Van Tine and Alpeter "pulled back into the woods and radioed back the situation. Colonel Rosebaum came to the head of the waiting column at this time to appraise the situation." (Reeves' Combat Interview)

 Rosebaum now ordered the two remaining platoons of C Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion to dismount from their vehicles and move to the left through the woods and approach the southern edge of Poteau from the west. The armored infantry were also ordered to radio back when they had gained a foothold in the village. The remaining platoon of C Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion, which had been the support of Reeves' tanks, was ordered "due north thru the woods….. where they were to lay down a base of fire." (Reeves' Combat Interview)

At approximately 1320, German shelling of the woods knocked out Colonel Rosebaum's half-track, although the CCA Commander was not injuried. At about the ame time a message was received that the infantry had reached the edge of Poteau. With this information at hand, Lieutenant Spencer and Sergeant Van Tine moved their tanks out of the woods and across the open area before the village.

 Spencer, in the lead, reached the edge of the village and placed his Sherman facing west. This put him next to a building that housed a machine gun and its crew. Without hesitation Spencer neutralized it. Van Tine following behind Spencer, headed for a position across the road from the Lieutenant with the intention of covering the area to the north and east.

As Van Tine neared the edge of the village his tank was subjected to a near miss from a panzerfaust fired from the building behind Spencer. Almost simultaneous to this the 75mm struck a tree to the right of the Sherman causing the turret to spin. Nelson, the young gunner, was stunned by the impact. "I was dazed as I was pressing my face against the sights when we hit and just then our tank commander yelled to shoot straight ahead." (letter to the author from Gerald Nelson, August 31, 1987.)

Van tine's order to fire was, without doubt, a reaction to the panzerfaust that had just missed his tank. With no immediate response to his order and certainly realizing a quick measure was absolutely necessary to save his imperiled crew and tank, Van Tine climbed out the turret hatch. Manning the .50 caliber machine gun he was almost immediately struck in the head. (Van Tine's intention to leave the tank can only be concluded from the known facts. It is unreasonable to suppose that the tank commander left the Sherman and the security it offered simply to fire at a sniper. Gerald Nelson supports this view. "I don't think Van Tine would have gotten out of our tank to fire a sniper. A sniper wasn't a threat but a bazooka was.")

Nelson's dazed condition was short-lived. "Within seconds I found front and", with Clapper loading, "put a round in each of three buildings I thought was the problem, and looked for Van Tine for further instructions." Seeing the tank commander was not in his position above him, Nelson climbed up to look out the turret. Ducking back into the hatchway because of small arms fire, the gunner chanced another look and "saw Van Tine laying half off the deck." (Gerald Nelson letter, January 22, 1997.)

All of this could be heard by Sergeant Hondorp whose tank was on the road in the wooded area beyond the village. "Van Tine wasn't switching his radio back and forth. We heard him shouting instructions and targets to his crew, to his platoon leader and expletives to himself and the 'Jerries.' We heard commands to him to get back into the protection of the turret. Then we heard he'd been hit - he was down." (Hondorp letter, September 1986. Amazingly this letter was received one month after Nelson's letter had described the same action which had taken place 42 years before. Neither man knew of the other's existence.)

At this point Nelson recalled, "I yelled inside he had been hit…..so I yelled to give me 3 seconds to get out and grab him and then take off which we did." Crawling towards Van Tine "I just pulled him to the back of the turret and held him in my arms. We were protected from the front by the big chunck of iron, just crouching down." (Gerald Nelson's letter, August 31, 1987 and January 22, 1997) As the driver Michael Tabacher, headed for the woods Nelson applied a bandage to the tank commander's head. Finally, after crossing the open area to the security of the woods the tank halted and members of the column on the road lifted Van Tine down from the rear deck. I was the last time the young gunner saw his commander. (In the excitement and tenseness of the situation, Gerald Nelson cannot remember if he was under fire during the withdrawal. It is very probable that he was.)

As the lone tank in Poteau, Lieutenant Spencer was in a tight spot. Only a portion of the infantry had been able to gain a foothold because of intense machine gun fire. To strengthen the tenuous grip that this small group was maintaining, Lieutenant Reeves and Sergeant Alpeter crossed the open space and joined Spencer's tank. "Shortly thereafter Lieutenant James L. Sparing, 2nd Platoon Leader, moved his tank down to replace Van Tine". (Reeves, Combat Interview) All four tanks could go no further than the edge of the village since fighting in a confined area of buildings, without infantry support, is risky at best. Fortunately the German machine guns that had been delaying the advance were flanked and silenced. These gun positions had been set up in a wooded area to the southwest of the village and had to be eradicated first. With the success the balance of the two platoons of C Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion entered Poteau and moved into the buildings around which the tanks were huddled and eliminated the snipers. "The infantry next set up positions around the tanks to provide the necessary protection for the fast approaching night." (Reeves' Combat Interview. Although Hasbrouck, the Division Commander, dispatched the following message to Colonel Rosebaum at 1600: Imperative you seize Poteau this PM and hold it", it had no bearing on the fight. The assault had already been carried out and the occupation was in progress.) It was now an infantryman's fight.

As the light faded the armored infantry moved forward and cleared out the panzergrenadiers in bitter house to house fighting. As the Germans fell back they received close-in support from assault guns north of the village.

Firing down the main street of Poteau they delivered armor piercing shells into the buildings at the southern edge of the village. Rosebaum now began to tighten the noose. Although Company A, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion had initially moved into the village it was quickly ordered to sweep the woods east of Poteau and move in a northerly direction. Next, Rosebaum directed that B Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion link up with the right flank of A Company 48th Armored Infantry. This extended line thus provided protection to the column positioned on the road leading back to Saint-Vith and acted as the right flank for Poteau. The CCA Commander then firmed up his left by moving a platoon of C Company, 48th Armored Infantry west of the road into the village and to the woods beyond. Further to this, Rosebaum sent the tanks of Lieutenant Gline's 3rd Platoon of C Company to high ground overlooking the village.

While these movements were in progress the remaining tanks which had been strung out on the road in the woods leading to Poteau were now consolidated. The lest three of these, Shermans of 2nd Platoon, C Company were just beyond the fartest clearing leading to the village.

A messenger from Captain Roy Nelson made his way back to the three tanks with an order to cross the clearing and reinforce the position up the road. What followed, although the experience of but one crew, typifies the tension and stress CCA endured that day.

The first tank in line cleared the opening, subjected to a late shot by a German assault gun firing from the right. The second tank, that of Platoon sergeant Freeman "hit the opening at full speed. This time, 'Jerry' was ready. He led his target perfectly and midway in the 200 yards opening he fired. The shot was too high." All of this was watched by Sergeant Donald Hondorp and his crew. "My God, we were last and next and he must have his bracket down perfect now." Over the radio intercom Hondorp told the driver, Norman Krebs, to move when ready.

 "I heard Norm respond with, 'Well, this is it', and without any engine warm-up we were moving into the opening. Midway across, while shifting gears, the monster hesitated coincidental with 'Jerry's' shot. I swear that cold engine saved our lives. The bracket was perfect - I could almost see that shell pass at target level in front of the 75mm muzzle. We made the protection of the wooded roadway." (Hondrop letters, September 1986 and January 25, 1997)

Throughout the evening of December 18th there were patrol action around Poteau, but CCA maintained its position. (B Company and one platoon of A Company, 40th Tank Battalion, were bivouacked about 3 km east of Poteau along the road leading to the village while the balance of A Company was protecting CCA Headquarters or on roadblock duty). It had won the crossroads and did not relinquish its hold until the withdrawal from the Saint-Vith salient on December 23.

Afterward

Combat Command A, 7th Armored Division

Within 36 hours of its withrawal from the Saint-Vith salient Rosebaum's command was overwhelmed at Manhay. Ordered to make a retrograde movement on the evening of December 24th at the exact same hour rhat the Germans of 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" struck, CCA suffered heavy losses.

C Company, 40th Tank Battalion - CCA

Expecting the withdrawal of friendly units through its position on the evening of December 24th, C Company was caught in a medow just south of Manhay by advancing Panthers. C Company lost all nine of the Shermans that remained after its six day fight at Poteau.

Colonel Dwight A. Rosebaum - Commander Combat Command A.

Rosebaum, the good soldier, was relieved of his command after Manhay.

 Lieutenant Gerald E. Reeves - 1st Platoon Leader, C Company, 40th Tank Battalion.

Lieutenant Reeves was wounded on December 19th, but survived his wound.

 Sergeant Donald Hondorp - 2nd Platoon, C Company, 40th Tank Battalion.

Sergeant Hondrop lost his tank in the meadow south of Manhay.

Sergeant Truman Luther Van Tine - 1st Platoon, C Company - 40th Tank Battalion.

 Sergeant Van Tine was awarded, posthumously, the Silver Star, he rests in Henri-Chapelle Cemetery (Belgium)

Corporal Gerald Nelson, 1st Platoon, C Company - 40th Tank Battalion.

Corporal Nelson knocked out three tanks during the subsequent fighting around Poteau. He lost his Sherman during the withdrawal from the Saint-Vith salient. Never commended or decorated for his heroic action on December 18th, Nelson's final comment with respect to Van Tine - "He was my friend, he was an American soldier, he needed me".