The Battle of Elsenborn

December 1944 (Part IV of V)

MONDAY DECEMBER 18^th - J -DAY+ 2

* “Stösser” Operation

            While in Bergscheid, von der Heydte waited all day for the arrival of the 6. PZA. The 24 hours worth of food his troops had carried with them was nearly exhausted and their ammunition was getting low. During the following night a Ju-52 dropped several containers over the area where the paratroopers were hiding. Only one container was located and it contained wet cigarettes and schnaps (hard liquor).

* Konzen-Montjoie-Höfen-Alzen Sector

            Just before dawn the German canons and Nebelwerfer started to fire their weapons. The telephone lines, strung by O’Brien’s units were cut.  Nevertheless he stayed in contact with Butler Mc Clernand by radio. As soon as the artillery barrage stopped a group of about 40 grenadiers of the 326. VDG managed to penetrate through the defense north of Höfen.  A battle was fought in the dark at close quarters. The results remainded uncertain for a long time.  As dawn appeared it turned out to be in favor of the Americans.

            Half an hour after their set back the Germans artillery again pounded the American positions. Numerous houses were destroyed but the GI’s were well dug in and are able to resist. Another assault was launched assisted by canon fire.  They penetrated 300 meters (984 feet) into the village. They advanced with great hesitation because they found out they were shelled by their own artillery. Butler Mc Clernand brought in his reserves into the battle and again repulsed the enemy.  He even succeeding in capturing several assault canons.

            At 10.00 (10:00 AM) 900 German men, supported by armored vehicles, initiated a new attack from the Rohren area.  This was the seventh attempt. The assault canons were able to cut open the barbed wire and destroyed the minefields. However, the Germans appeared to be overly careful.  They were afraid of the American anti-tank guns. Two hundred more courageous grenadiers reached the church threatening the forward artillery observation post and also Butler Mc Clernand’s Command Post. Here again the American drivers, cooks, clerks and telephone operators took part in the battle opposing the German incursion. The situation was becoming desperate. Butler Mc Clernand requested artillery support to fire on his own positions.  Six times, for five minutes each, 105 millimeter shells (4.13 inch) from Mützenich and Ternell fell upon the American defense lines. Each lull was purposely set to permit Colonel Butler Mc Clernand to call for a cease fire.  He would call on if his own men fell victim to the artillery barrage. The Americans were properly protected while the German grenadiers, who were in the open, were mowed down in great numbers.  During the sixth attempt Butler Mc Clernand called for the artillery to cease-fire while he engaged his reserves supported by heavy mortars.  A few Germans were able to take refuge in houses.  Shelling by the 57-millimeter (2.25 inch) guns destroyed the houses one by one and sprayed the fleeing enemy with white phosphorus shells. Twenty-five stunned grenadiers surrendered. This attack, which was one of the most violent since the start of the offensive, also failed. The sight of so many dead was so horrible many of the GI's were subjected to nervous breakdowns. They had to be evacuated. It would not be the last attempt by the Germans to capture Colonel Butler Mc Clernand’s position. The Germans would try again further south without success.

            The 47^th IR, 9^th ID, assigned to the 9^th Army was placed under the command of General Gerow.  He moved it towards Montjoie (Monschau) to support O’Brien and Butler Mc Clernand. This regiment never encountered the slightest obstacle between Eupen and Mützenich. One company met with the 38^th RS.  German artillery slowed the other companies down. However, they settle down in Höfen and east of Kalterherberg-Elsenborn Village road.  It was still being defended by the 99^th RT and a few isolated elements of the 2^nd ID.

            On this same day, December 18^th, U.S. Captain Goetcheus notified Landrat (County Commissioner) Scheibler that the principal danger had been reduced and that his military government would not leave the town even if the German artillery continued to pound the area.

            Newly arrived artillery reinforcements reached Mützenich and were able to provide artillery support over Höfen, Alzen, Rocherath, Krinkelt and Bullange (Büllingen).

* Wahlerscheid-Rocherath-Krinkelt

            Mackenzie received a radio message to pull back his unit and to set up a defense line on Elsenborn Ridge. He started the maneuver at 14.00 (2:00 PM). When Robertson heard about this move, which he had never ordered, he realized that Mackenzie had been duped by a German who was able to sound like Robertson or one of his subordinates. He ordered Mackenzie to make an about face and retake the positions he had previously left and to hold the line at all cost. In order to allow the 2^nd ID (-) and the 324^th BN to pull back these instructions were followed without hesitation.

            The first German attack on Rocherath was repulsed during the night of December 17^th. Another attack started at 07.00 (7:00 AM) this position on the Lausdell farm. By 11.00 (11:00 AM) this position could not continue to resist.  Only 30% of the troops, who had arrived the day before, had survived! Orders were given to pull back towards Rocherath and later to Elsenborn. The falling raain is very icy. 

            That same day General Gerow placed the 99^th ID under the command of General Robertson. This was not to discredit General Lauer’s performance, but rather a necessity. Too many units of these two divisions were intermingled.  The troops had to be placed under a single command. Gerow chose Robertson because of his seniority, his well-known skills at maneuvering troops, he happened to be in the combat area and above all else he already had part of the 99^th ID under his command.

* Rathsberg-Weisser Stein-Losheimergraben Sector

            That morning the 12. PZD attempted to get out of the woods, where it had been held up, along the Jansbach. American Artillery counterattacked in force and pounded the Germans throughout the afternoon.

            The survivors of the 393^rd IR (-) were worn out, had very little ammunition, practically no food yet they refused to surrender. Since the Krinkelt-Elsensborn road had been partially taken-over by the Germans this Regiment destroyed as much of their equipment as possible.  Then the men forced their way toward the combat team, which had taken up a position along the Wahlerscheid road. To reach this position they had to go through the positions held by the 3^rd BN, 23^rd IR, 2^nd ID. The 3^rd BN was able to pull back to the line held by the 9^th IR, 2^nd ID.

The 394^th IR quickly found itself in a bad position and had to pull back.  This was a catastrophic retreat. Early the next morning, 1^st BN, 393^rd IR, caught up with the 2^nd BN, 344^th IR, joined forces and pulled back towards Murrange. The Germans had already taken Murrange.

            The delays affecting German units were aggravated by the extra weight carried by German soldiers.  They were looting everything they could put their hands on. Priority was given to American cigarettes and chocolate.

* The Butgenbach Estate (Dom. Butgenbach) Sector

            Throughout the day the men of the 2^nd BN, 26^th IR, 1^st ID, commanded by Colonel Daniel, were actively digging deep trenches and covering them with logs supporting sandbags. Patrols were sent out to locate the Germans. On the left, the 3^rd BN had taken position to the west of Wirtzfeld.  On the right the 1^st BN was positioned in reserve around Butgenbach. West of this Battalion one could find a six-kilometer (3.7 miles) void. This was the reason that the field hospital, located at Waimes, pulled back.   The 6.000 tons of ammunition located at Robertville depot had to be evacuated.  The depot had been moved when the American had to vacate Waimes.  Luckily the day was calm. The 18^th IR, 1^st ID, which had just completed chasing paratroops of Colonel von der Heydte , filled this six-kilometer void.

            During this time General Gerow, without taking a moment of rest, reinforced his defenses especially his artillery defenses between Montjoie (Monschau) and Malmedy.

* In Spa

            General Hodges’ headquarters left Spa and settled in Chaudfontaine.

* In Germany

            At dusk, General von Manteuffel was still held up on the outskirts of Saint-Vith.  He came to the conclusion that the offensive was a failure and the Germans would never reach the Meuse River. Generals von Rundstedt and Jodl had the same opinion. However, Hitler was obstinate.

TUESDAY DECEMBER 19^th - J -DAY + 3

            The weather was not good.  It was cloudy and cold.  A thick fog that iced up despite the wind covering the area. The afternoon thaw made it very difficult for the American tanks to progress. Their narrow tracks lacked rubber cleats.  this did allow them to grip the soil. On the other hand the wider tracks of the German Köning Tiger tanks gave them an advantage.  However, their heavy weight stopped them from taking many of the side roads. A few allied airplanes managed to fly that day.  

* Stösser” Operation

            At dawn the German paratroopers were frozen stiff and had run out of food. They decided to head east. They waded through the icy Schoristaine and Helle rivers.  They finally managed to reach Alt-Hattlich. From there they attempted to cross the Königliches Torf-Moor (a swamp) to reach the Eupen-Mützenich road hoping to reach friendly troops. They had barely reached the road when they were caught in the crossfire of several machine gun nests. They pulled back in disarray having suffered heavy losses. Throughout the day they were confronted many times by patrols of the 18^th IR.  Colonel von der Heydte did not allow them to fight with the American troops. He wass more convinced that his mission was doomed. Thirty-six American prisoners were captured.  They were all sent back carrying one German, who had a belly wound. After crossing the Helle again, the paratroopers retreated to the summit of the Porfays Crest to spend the night.

            That evening, the 18^th IR received orders to stop pursuing the paratroopers and head south to rejoin the bulk of the 1^st ID.

* Konzen-Montjoie-Höfen-Alzen Sector

            The 38^th RS, the 3^rd BN, 395^th IR, 99^th ID; the 47^th IR, 9^th ID with the support of the 196^th Field Artillery Battalion were holding their ground. The artillery had no difficulty holding back any attempt made by the enemy. In the afternoon a few allied fighter-bombers attacked the enemy lines.  This was a morale booster for the GI’s who had suffered so much during the preceding days. The American troops were still subjected to canon and mortar fire. The few German attacks were poorly organized and  easily repelled. At dusk, as the wounded soldiers and those killed in action were evacuated, the Americans were resupplied with ammunition and food.

            In this sector the worse combat fighting was a thing of the past. Heavy combat was in full force south of this sector especially around the Butgenbach Estate (Dom. Butgenbach). The German losses were particularly heavy.  Some accounts mentioned that thousands of Germans were killed in action. During that time only 9 Americans were killed, 14 were missing and 4 were taken prisoner.  Other sources of information said about 40 American soldiers were listed as causalities. All in all the American losses were minor compared to the German losses.

            Throughout the offensive both side announced numerous times that Montjoie (Monschau) had been captured by the Germans then recaptured by the Americans. All of this was false; at no time was the town abandoned by the Americans.

* Rocherath-Krinkelt Sector

            By 05.30 (5:30 AM) the Mackenzie Combat Team had retaken the area they had previously abandoned. Later the 9th and the 38th IR, as well as the 324th Engineer Battalion joined it. At 13.30 (1:30 PM) the combat team was, this time, correctly told to pull back at 17.30 (5:30 PM) and to head for Wirtzfeld.  There the 9^th IR was waiting to greet them.  From there they headed for Elsenborn. The 2nd ID engineers, who had made it one way to the rear, had maintained the road between Wirtzfeld and Elsenborn. This allowed the vehicles to pull back in good order while the troops walked back towards Elsenborn.

This movement of troops was done completely in the dark yet in an orderly manner.  All the injured soldiers were carried out of the area which had been subjected to enemy fire. It ended at 02.00 (2:00 AM) on December 20^th.  Half an hour later the 9^th IR also passed west of Roderhöhe.

            While the Germans were held up in Rocherath, they managed to take control of Krinkelt by dusk on December 19^th.

* Murrange (Mürringen) Sector

            The men of the 1^st BN, 393^rd IR and the 2^nd BN, 394^th IR who had escaped alive, merged together and attempted to enter Murrange (Mürringen) shortly after midnight. They were not successful so the bypassed the village. They had destroyed most of their equipment and made a beeline through the snow to finally reach Wirtzfeld. They were completely exhausted. They were finally able to stop their own artillery fire from pounding the retreating troops.

* Bullange (Büllingen) and the Butgenbach Estate (Dom. Butgenbach) Sector

            The 30^th ID[60], commanded by General Major Leland S. Hobbs, also from the 9th Army, takes position  at Elsenborn where it took position on the right flank of the 1^st ID. It took a defensive position around noon the day before and extended its defense up to Waimes and even further.

[60] The 30^th Infantry Division was called “Old Hickory”.

            During the night of December 18^th the German 12. PZD occupied Bullange Büllingen) and prepared to attack Butgenbach around 02.30 (2:30 AM). Twelve tanks and between 400 and 500 infantrymen of the 1.PZK attacked. However, the Americans pounded them with explosive and withe phosphorus shells.  The infantry used bazookas to repel two German attempts to pierce the new line of defense. Again at 07.00 (7:00 AM), 10.15 (10:15 AM) and later in the afternoon three more attacks were repulsed causing heavy losses to the American troops. These attacks went on for four more days; the Germans were never successful. They were slaughtered throughout each engagement.  

*   *    *

            The northern flank was definitely stabilized. At the time one could claim that the Elsenborn battle had been won.  Even so other enemy attempts were initiated in the coming days. The northern battle successes could probably be credited to the artillery, which not only supported the infantry and the armored units, but on many occasions was able to stop the progress of the enemy by means of their fire power. Two examples of artillery effectiveness were the battle between Kalterherberg and Wirtzfeld and on the east side of the Elsenborn Camp maneuver fields.

WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 20^th – J + 4

            The persistently bad weather kept the Allied air force from flying. The thick mud that accumulated in every depression slowed down vehicle movement. The heavy fog reduced visibility. On every crest the frost had hardened the soil.

* “Stösser” Operation

            Colonel von der Heydte understood that the German 6. PZA had definitely failed its mission and that his own operation did not make any sense. He had no knowledge of who was occupying Montjoie (Monschau); was it the Germans or the Americans? His men were exhausted.  By noon he decided to end his operation. The paratroopers buried all nonessential equipment and all the weapons which had no ammunition. He then ordered his men to disperse into groups of three and attempt to pass through the American lines to reach the German line. For some unexplicable reason he took his second in command and his orderly and headed for Eupen. Then he made an about-face. The three men again crossed the Helle at the Petit-Bonheur ford and headed for Montjoie (Monschau).

* Konzen-Montjoie (Monschau)-Höfen-Alzen Sector

Many times throughout the day the 3^rd BN was attacked.  However, it never gave an inch to the enemy.

            All the units in this area were placed under the command of the 47^th IR, 9^th  ID. While the 3^rd BN mortars were shelling Kalterherberg one of the fins broke off from the mortar shell, deviated off course, and hit a house in Höfen. This house had just been occupied by a platoon of the 47^th IR. The house was completely demolished by the fire. When the prone-to-anger commander of the 9^th ID was notified of this accident he declared that this action was done on purpose to hurt his men!  It took a great deal of time for Butler Mc Clernand to convince him it was an accident.

            The bodies of the American soldiers killed in action were evacuated by a special unit called the Grave Registration.  The German bodies also had to be buried by the GI’s. The soil was frozen.  Many of the German dead were thrown into wells or reservoirs. When Butler Mc Clernand heard about the way the German casualties were being disposed of he ordered his troops to retrieve every German body from the wells and had them given a decent burial. He wanted to the water supplies weren't polluted.

* Elsenborn Ridge

            The 2^nd ID (-) and the Mackenzie Combat Team pulled back during the night. This difficult maneuver was performed perfectly thanks to Robertson’s coordination. This was only made possible because he was commanding both Divisions.

            The GI’s who were able to escape from Murrrange (Mürringen) during the night had a short rest in Wirtzfeld, which was ablaze, before heading for the Elsenborn Ridge. There the troops were issued new equipment. The engineers placed mines in the area behind their defensive line. The Mackenzie Combat Team was dissolved. The 1^st and 2^nd BNs, 395^th IR were used as the 99^th ID's Reserves. The 393^rd IR reacquired its 2^nd BN and what was left of the 394^th IR.  It had barely enough men to hold the defensive line usually assigned to a regiment. The same situation occurred within the 2^nd ID.  It had been reassigned between the 99^th and the 1^st IDs. From there on the defense of Elsenborn Ridge was impregnable.

            This was confirmed at 090 (9:00 AM) when the German grenadiers of the 3. PZGD, who were coming from Rocherather-Baracken area, attacked the newly formed defenses.  The GI’s of the 3^rd BN, 393^rd IR and GI’s of the 324^th Engineer Battalion were side by side.  Tanks, bazookas, .50 caliber machine guns were used to repel the enemy. Two hours later the Germans attacked for a second time.  The American, once again, used high explosive and white phosphorus shells combined with mortar fire. Again the Germans were beaten back. By the end of the afternoon the German tanks, loaded with infantrymen, attacked for a third time. Again the Germans were defeated. As this third wave of Germans was moving forward another team of Germans, also supported by tanks, attacked the 394^th IR. The Germans were unsuccessful.

* Bullange (Büllingen)-Butgenbach Estate (Dom. Butgenbach)-Waimes Sector

            The engineers continued to lay mines on both access roads to the estate. Colonel Daniel acquired six 57-millimeters canons and an infantry company which was held as the regimental reserve.

            A battalion of German fusiliers, supported by approximately 20 tanks, attacked the estate from both the east and the south between 05.00 (5:00 AM) and 06.00 (6:00 AM). The tanks, guided by flares, continued to progress despite the heavy shelling by three American field artillery battalions and a battery of 90-millimeters (3.54 inches) anti-Aircraft Artillery. The Germans were forced to head west. Tank Destroyers managed to blow up two of the three leading tanks.  Among them was the German commander’s tank. As the third tank commander raised his head out of his turret, he was killed by a pistol shot fired by an American. The driver of this tank backed up in a hurry. Only four tanks managed to get into the estate. Two were set on fire. Three other were not able to continue. The German infantry was pounded heavy shelling. The attack was stopped. Only a few Panzerfaust continued to battle the American troops.

            At 10.15 (10:15 AM), a new assault was launched by many German companies.  Again they had to retreat due to the heavy shelling of the American artillery. From then on only enemy patrols continued to test the American resistance. This went on until dusk.

* At the various Headquarters at the rear of the front

            At the Allied headquarters General Eisenhower had given Field Marshal Montgomery the command of the Bulge’s entire northern flank. The entire U.S. 9^th Army and also the 1^st Army, except for General Middleton’s 8^th Corps, were handed over to the 21^st Army Group.  Montgomery arrived at General Hodges’ Headquarters located in Chaudfontaine, at 13.00 (1:00 PM) and wanted to pull back General Collins’ 7^th Corps from the Rur area and use it as the 9^th Army Reserve. General Hodges vehemently opposed this idea.  Montgomery yielded to Hodges.

            At the German side Model had lost all hope of conquer Butgenbach and Malmedy. The 6. PZA had failed miserably. With the agreement of General von Rundstedt, Model’s primary role was passed on to the 5. PZA.  Genral Dietrich's mission had been reduced to protecting Genral von Manteuffel’s north flank. The reorganization of the 6. PZA adversely affected the route assigned by Hitler to the 5. PZA.  This provoked some of the worse bottlenecks and road jams.

THURSDAY DECEMBER 21 – J + 5

            Rain, snow and fog followed one another affecting both the hilly crests and the lower valleys. Flying conditions were very bad. In some areas the temperature only reached 3 degrees Celsius (37.4 degrees Fahrenheit) in the afternoon.  Iin most areas the temperature stayed below freezing throughout the rest of the day.

* “Stösser” Operation

            On the 21^st Colonel von der Heydte and his two companions continued their painful wandering. Completely exhausted, suffering from pneumonia, a broken arm and fearing frozen feet Colonel von der Heydte decided to surrender. The other two were younger and in better physical condition.  They were given permission to continue trying to escape. Colonel von der Heydte took shelter for the night under a railroad bridge located near Mützenich.

* Konzen-Montjoie-Höfen-Alzen Sector

            Throughout the day many paratroopers attempted to reach the German lines. They were taken prisoners at Montjoie (Monschau). The American soldiers performed a thorough house-to-house search in Montjoie (Monschau). All the traffic was halted and all “passes” issued to German civilians were canceled. The American troops even took over the duties of transporting flour coming from Rötgen, milk coming from Mützenich and fodder coming from Kalterherberg.  This was everything required to feed the civilian population and their animals.  

            Just as the previous day no shells fall on Montjoie. However, the Germans intensified the shelling of Mützenich trying to slow down the American Artillery.  They continued to pound the German lines. The civilian population, whose houses were the target of the artillery, fled towards Eupen.

            The 47^th IR, 9^th ID relieved the 38^th RS and the 3^rd BN, 395^th IR, 99^th ID; the latter two headed for, and took, the defensive positions at Elsenborn.

            In this sector the front no further changes would occur until the American troops get back on the offensive.

* Elsenborn Ridge

            A few isolated men, who escaped the German attacks, managed to reach the west section of the Ridge. The 99^th ID was reduced to 70% of its original strength.  It was reorganized defending an area usually assigned to a regiment. Some of its companies had lost two thirds of their men; others up to three-quarters. The 2^nd ID was similarly affected.

* Butgenbach Estate (Dom. Butgenbach)

            German artillery violently pounded the estate around 02.30 (2:30 AM).  American artillery was not able to put a stop to the German pounding. Many buildings were blazing. At dawn the Germans moved forward using both roads leading to the estate. The American mines, infantry, tanks and tank destroyers were not able to slow down the Germans. Colonel Daniel asked his own artillery to shell his positions which were being overrun by the Germans. The German tanks were able to enter the estate and fire point blank at the buildings. However, the grenadiers failed to follow the tanks. Some tank destroyers came to the rescue and the 81-millimeter mortars also helped to force the assailants to retreat. A little later the 4.2” mortars of the 2^nd ID got involved. The 2^nd BN ended the day in very poor shape.  It lost 250men. But the Germans left 800 of their own men on the battlefield.

            Shortly after midnight the engineers laid new mines on the outskirts of the position.

FRIDAY DECEMBER 22 – J + 6

            The atmospheric conditions stayed unchanged; it alternated between snow and rain showers but the fog remained constant.

* “Stösser” Operation

            At dawn Colonel von der Heydte was exhausted; he left his shelter and knocked on the door of the first house he found occupied. The house belonged to Mr. Bouschery who was a teacher.  He comforted the German officer. He fed the colonel and even offered him his bed to rest.  He also confirmed what the colonel was afraid of; Montjoie was in the hands of the Americans. The colonel wrote a note to the authorities controlling the town and asked his host’s son to carry the message to Montjoie (Monschau). Captain Goetcheus was given the message.  He sent a doctor, an ambulance and many armed men to capture the colonel. The soldiers weren't necessary.  After receiving the appropriate care he was transferred to Eupen where he was interrogated at General Gerow’s Headquarters.

            Throughout the day other paratroopers reached Montjoie (Monschau). They were taken prisoners and marched away from the front. Approximately 100 surrendered out of 800 who jumped during this operation.  Only 240 out of the 1.200 scheduled to be involved in this operation were able to get back to the German lines.

* Konzen-Montjoie-Höfen-Alzen-Kalterherberg Sector

            Surely there would be other skirmishes but none of them would turn out to be decisive.

* Hohe Mark-Dickelt-Kodenhövel-Roderhöhe

            On the other hand, many furious attacks were aimed at the GI’s located on the eastside of the Elsenborn Camp maneuver fields. This area was between Hohe Mark, who will be conquered and retaken several times, and Roderhöhe. The Germans managed to go through a minefield, piercing the 99^th RT line, cutting a swat 900 meters deep (2,954 feet) and encircling two of its platoons. A Company of the 47^th IR, 9^th ID and the other members of the 99^th RT intervened and repulsed the Germans.

            The Butgenbach estate (Dom. Butgenbach) was subjected to numerous deadly assaults.  Repeatedly Tiger and Panther tanks, accompanied by infantrymen carrying Panzerfaust pushed their way into the estate. Many shells pierced the building where Lieutenant Colonel Daniel had installed his Command Post. The GI’s lying in their trenches, were crushed by the tracks of the German tanks. However, the defenders held on and finally managed to push the aggressors back.

            By day’s end the 12. PZG had lost three quarters of its tanks. The extraordinary resistance put up by the men of Colonel Daniel’s team would deserve a complete book written about their magnificent performance.

* In Germany

            On this day von Rundstedt, Model and Guderian asked to be allowed to pull back behind the West Wall. The Führer refused to listen to their advice.